Marching to Madness: Dual Use Trademarks after Illinois High School Association v. GTE Vantage by Berger, Jonathan
Hastings Communications and Entertainment Law Journal
Volume 21 | Number 4 Article 4
1-1-1999
Marching to Madness: Dual Use Trademarks after
Illinois High School Association v. GTE Vantage
Jonathan Berger
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/
hastings_comm_ent_law_journal
Part of the Communications Law Commons, Entertainment, Arts, and Sports Law Commons,
and the Intellectual Property Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Hastings Communications and Entertainment Law Journal by an authorized editor of UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. For more information,
please contact wangangela@uchastings.edu.
Recommended Citation
Jonathan Berger, Marching to Madness: Dual Use Trademarks after Illinois High School Association v. GTE Vantage, 21 Hastings Comm.
& Ent. L.J. 785 (1999).
Available at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/hastings_comm_ent_law_journal/vol21/iss4/4
Marching to Madness:
"Dual Use" Trademarks After




I. Trademark Law: A Brief Introduction ........................ 789
II. Abandonment Issues: Had IHSA Abandoned the
"March Madness" Mark? ........................................... 791
III. Why is This Reverse Confusion Different From Any
Other Reverse Confusion? ........................................ 796
IV. What's So Terrible About Dual Use? ......................... 803
V . Conclusion ............................................................... 806
* J.D. magna cum laude, University of California, Hastings College of the
Law, 1999; B.A., University of California at Santa Cruz, 1976. The author
gratefully acknowledges the invaluable assistance of Prof. Margreth Barrett in
bringing this case to his attention and discussing the issues it raises; of Oren
Katzeff, Hastings class of 1999, for the intensive tutorial on the intricacies of
college basketball, and most particularly of Richard W. Young, counsel for the
Illinois High School Association in this case, who generously provided the court
documents cited herein.
HASTINGS COMM/ENT L.J.
The gym lights gleam like a beacon beam
And a million motors hum
In a good will flight on a Friday night;
For basketball beckons, "Come"
A sharp-shooting mite is king tonight.
The Madness of March is running.
The winged feet fly, the ball sails high
And field goal hunters are gunning.
With war nerves tense, the final defense
Is the courage, strength and will
In a million lives where freedom thrives
And liberty lingers still.
Now eagles fly and heroes die
Beneath some foreign arch
Let their sons tread where hate is dead
In a happy Madness of March.'
Introduction
The association between madness and the month of
March probably entered the cultural consciousness of the
English-speaking world by way of naturalists' observations
that "[hiares are unusually shy and wild in March, which is
their rutting season."2 Erasmus used the phrase "mad as a
March hare" as early as 1542. The term was a literary staple
by the middle of the nineteenth century,4 and of course its
greatest exponent was Lewis Carroll, who created the memo-
rably mad March Hare character in his classic Alice's Adven-
tures in Wonderland.5
1. Illinois High School Association, Origins of "March Madness" (visited
Feb. 22, 1998) <http://www.ihsa.org/feature/madness/origin.htm> [hereinaf-
ter Origins] (quoting H. V. Porter, Basketball Ides of March, 1942).
2. E. COBHAM BREWER, THE DICTIONARY OF PHRASE AND FABLE 530 (Ivor H.
Evans, ed. 1981).
3. See id. (quoting Erasmus, Aphorisms).
4. See, e.g., CHARLOTrE BRONTE, THE PROFESSOR 221 (Margaret Smith &
Herbert Rosengarten, eds., Oxford Univ. Press 1991) ("You would be mad, then
- mad as a March hare..."); "Sir Nathaniel," American Authorship No. IV -
Herman Melville, NEW MONTHLY MAGAZINE OF LONDON, July, 1853 (book review)
(using the term in reference to the literary style of MOBY DICK).
5. See LEWIS CARROLL (CHARLES DODGSON), ALICE'S ADVENTURES IN
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March is also the month when basketball season draws
to a close, and the insanity associated with the championship
tournaments begins. The term "March Madness" was first
used in reference to this season by Henry V. Porter, the ex-
ecutive director of the Illinois High School Athletic Associa-
tion, as the title of a 1939 essay celebrating the indomitable
spirit of the high-school basketball player.' Three years later,
when the country was embroiled in World War II, Porter wrote
the poem quoted in part7 at the beginning of this Note as a
tribute to the high school basketball championship tourna-
ment's ability to "provide[] a unifying force that brought the
entire state together."
8
The Illinois High School Association (hereinafter "IHSA")
began using the term "March Madness" in reference to its
basketball championship tournament in the early 1940's.9
The term became familiar to Chicago sportscaster Brent
Musburger when he covered the IHSA tournament in the
early 1960's and 1970's, ° and when Musburger began cov-
ering the National College Athletic Association (hereinafter
"NCAA") "Final Four" championship games for CBS in 1982,
he used the term to designate them." 'The term caught on
and is now widely used by the media and the public to denote
this basketball tournament as well as IHSA's." 12 "March Mad-
ness," at this point, is generally understood to refer to the
NCAA's Final Four tournament. 1
3
The two uses of the term coexisted peacefully for a num-
ber of years. During this period, IHSA used "March Madness"
as a common-law trademark in connection with souvenir
WONDERLAND 71-82 (Grosset & Dunlap, Illustrated Junior Libr. ed., n.d.).
6. See Origins, supra note 1 (quoting Henry V. Porter, March Madness, ILL.
HIGH SCH. ATHLETE, March, 1939).
7. See Origins, supra note 1.
8. Origins, supra note 1.
9. See Ill. High Sch. Ass'n v. GTE Vantage, Inc., 99 F.3d 244, 245 (7th Cir.
1996), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 1083 (1997).
10. See Glen Elsasser, No Advantage for IHSA in "March Madness": Supreme
Court Stays Out of Trademark Battle, CHI. TRIB., Feb. 25, 1997.
11. See Ill. High Sch. Ass'n, 99 F.3d at 245.
12. Id.
13. See the extensive sampling of quotations from media sources in Brief of
Defendant-Appellee GTE Vantage Incorporated at 4-7, Ill. High Sch. Ass'n (No.
96-1981).
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tournament items sold at tournaments, 4 but did not register
it with the Patent and Trademark Office,'5 and made no at-
tempt to prevent the media's ever-expanding use of the term.
The NCAA apparently did not use the term for its own pur-
poses during this period.16
The IHSA began licensing the use of "March Madness" in
1994, when it granted PepsiCo a license to use the term on
beverage cans.' 7 The NCAA, for its part, began licensing it in
1993.'8 In 1996, it issued a license to GTE Vantage, 9 who
used the term to promote a CD-ROM game entitled "NCAA
Championship Basketball," which GTE Vantage advertised in
magazines and on the World Wide Web.2° IHSA sued for
trademark infringement in March, 1996, following GTE's re-
fusal to agree to a licensing arrangement.2'
The District Court found that IHSA did not have a pro-
tectible trademark, 2  and the Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit, with Chief Judge Posner writing for a unanimous
panel, affirmed.23 While recognizing that "March Madness"
can hardly be called a generic term24 since it describes only
two of the hundreds of basketball tournaments which take
place annually in March,25 Judge Posner found that:
[tihere is no magic in labels. Let "March Madness" be called
not a quasi-generic term, or a term on its way to becoming
generic, but a dual-use term. Whatever you call it, it's a
name that the public has affixed to something other than,
as well as, the Illinois high school basketball tournament. A
trademark owner is not allowed to withdraw from the public
domain a name that the public is using to denote someone
else's good or service, leaving that someone and his cus-
tomers speechless. No case so holds, other than the cases
14. See Brief of Defendant-Appellee, supra note 13, at 8.
15. See id. at 9.
16. See Brief of Plaintiff-Appellant Illinois High School Association at 6, Ill.
High Sch. Ass'n (No. 96-198 1).
17. Seeid. at 12.
18. See id. at 11.
19. See id. at 13.
20. See id.
21. See id.
22. See Ill. High Sch. Ass'n, 99 F.3d at 246.
23. See id. at 248.
24. "Generic" in the sense that "aspirin" is generic, and hence unenforceable
as a trademark despite having been one originally; see Bayer Co. v. United Drug
Co., 272 F. 505, 509 (S.D.N.Y. 1921).
25. See Ill. High Sch. Ass'n, 99 F.3d at 247.
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involving generic names, but no case holds the contrary,
either. It is an issue of first impression, and we think that
for the sake of protecting effective communication it should
be resolved against trademark protection, thus assimilating
dual-use or multiple-use terms to generic terms.
26
It is remarkable enough when a federal appellate judge
announces that there is no magic in labels; one cannot help
but wonder whether the distinction between the labels "mur-
der" and "manslaughter" has any ongoing vitality in Judge
Posner's view. It is considerably more remarkable, though, to
see an entirely new entry in the trademark taxonomy - the
freshly-minted "dual-use" category - created with the stroke
of a pen, and then, four sentences later, subsumed within
"generic terms." If there is indeed such a thing as a dual-use
trademark, Judge Posner offers no justification for his insis-
tence, in the face of his apparent concession that the par-
ticular mark at issue here is not generic, that such marks
should be classed with generic terms, beyond the entirely
conclusory declaration that such classification "protect[s] ef-
fective communication.
27
This article takes the position that there was no need to
create the concept of the "dual-use trademark" at all; that the
existing trademark-law framework was perfectly adequate for
the task of adjudicating issues such as the one presented
here; and that the potential perils of dual-use trademarks far
outweigh any benefits which might spring from their exis-
tence.
I
Trademark Law: A Brief Introduction
Trademarks are indicators of the origin of a product,
good, or service; their fundamental purpose is to enable con-
sumers to reward the vendor of quality goods by buying more
of them and to penalize the vendor of shoddy goods by
avoiding them.28 The overarching goal of trademark law is "to
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. See United States v. Steffens, 100 U.S. (10 Otto) 82, 87 (1879) (trade-
marks "are the means by which manufacturers and merchants identify their
manufactures and merchandise. They are the symbols by which men engaged
in trade and manufactures become known in the marts of commerce, by which
their reputation and that of their goods are extended and published .... .");
Qualitex Co. v. Jacobsen Products, Inc., 514 U.S. 159, 163 (1995) (purpose of a
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ensure that consumers are able to rely on marks in exercising
their preferences by prohibiting competitors from using
marks in a way that confuses consumers about the source of
a product or service."29 A trademark which fails to achieve
this goal is, at a philosophical level, no trademark at all.
Federal trademarks in the United States are regulated by
the Trademark Act of 1946, popularly known as the Lanham
Act.30 Prior to the passage of the Lanham Act, trademark
protection was considered to be inappropriate for federal
regulation; the right to exclusive use of a trademark was en-
forced only by the states.3 ' The Lanham Act both codified and
expanded the trademark protection previously afforded by
state common and statutory law. One of the Act's major inno-
vations was the introduction of the Principal Register, a re-
pository maintained by the federal Patent and Trademark Of-
fice where trademark owners who either use a mark in
commerce or intend to do so3 2 may register their marks. (The
ubiquitous "0" symbol designates a mark which has been so
registered.) Registering a mark on the principal register con-
fers certain benefits, the most important of which is "con-
structive notice." Under common law, a trademark was gen-
erally protected only in the geographic area where it was
actually used,33 but a registered mark is considered to be
"used," in this sense, across the entire U.S. even if its use is
limited geographically as a factual matter. 4
However, trademark owners are not required to avail
themselves of these benefits. A trademark is protectible
whether it is registered or not; the Lanham Act expressly pro-
trademark is to "quickly and easily assure[] a potential customer that this item
- the item with this mark - is made by the same producer as other similarly
marked items that he or she liked (or disliked) in the past. At the same time, the
law helps assure a producer that it (and not an imitating competitor) will reap
the financial, reputation-related rewards associated with a desirable product.").
29. MARGRETH BARRETT, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY - PATENTS, TRADEMARKS, &
COPYRIGHTS 78 (2d ed. 1996-97).
30. 15 U.S.C.A. § § 1051-1127 (1994). The statute was originally enacted on
July 5, 1946.
31. See Terry Ann Smith, Telephone Numbers That Spell Generic Terms: A
Protectable Trademark or an Invitation to Monopolize a Market?, 28 U.S.F. L.
REV. 1079, 1081 n.18 (1994).
32. See Lanham Act § 1, 15 U.S.C.A. § 1051.
33. See Hanover Star Milling Co. v. Metcalf, 240 U.S. 403, 415-21 (1916);
see generally Smith, supra note 31, at 1081 n.20.
34. See Lanham Act § 22, 15 U.S.C.A. § 1072.
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vides remedies for infringement of both registered and un-
registered marks.3 5 The owner of an unregistered mark can
prevail in an infringement action against a defendant who
uses the mark in a manner which "is likely to cause confu-
sion ... as to the origin, sponsorship, or approval of his or
her goods." 6 Courts have found that such confusion is likely
under two broad classes of circumstances: the familiar
"palming off' or "direct confusion" scenario, where a small
and insignificant junior user37 attempts to free-ride on the
familiarity of a large and powerful senior user's mark;38 and
"reverse confusion" situations, where a large junior user
overwhelms the marketplace with its usage of a small senior
user's mark, thus creating the false impression that the sen-
ior user's goods or services originate with the junior user.39
II
Abandonment Issues: Had IHSA Abandoned the
"March Madness" Mark?
Under the Lanham Act, trademark ownership carries with
it certain responsibilities. Since "[ulsage, not registration,
confers the right to a trademark,"4" a trademark may lose its
35. As to registered marks, see Lanham Act § 32(1), 15 U.S.C.A. § 1114(1).
As to unregistered marks, see Lanham Act § 43(a), 15 U.S.C.A. § 1125(a);
moreover, the Lanham Act does not preempt existing state statutory and com-
mon law trademark protection. Compare, e.g., Copyright Act of 1976 § 301, 17
U.S.C.A. § 301, which explicitly announces Congress's intention to preempt
state copyright law.
36. Lanham Act § 43(a), 15 U.S.C.A. § 1125(a).
37. That is, one who begins using a trademark subsequently in time to a
"senior user." Note that "senior user" and "junior user" are comparative terms:
where there are three users of a mark, for example, the second in time is junior
to the first, but senior to the third.
38. See, e.g., Florence Mfg. Co. v. J. C. Dowd & Co., 178 F. 73 (2d Cir. 1910)
("the courts look with suspicion upon one who, in dressing his goods for the
market, approaches so near to his successful rival that the public may fail to
distinguish between them.").
39. See generally Big 0 Tire Dealers, Inc., v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co.,
561 F.2d 1365, 1372 (10th Cir. 1977), which is generally recognized as being
the first case to formally embrace the reverse confusion theory. For a thorough
critique of modem reverse-confusion law, see Note, Reverse Conjusion: Modify-
ing the Polaroid Factors to Achieve Consistent Results, 6 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP.
MEDIA& ENT. L.J. 179, 193 (1995).
40. WGBH Educ. Found., Inc. v. Penthouse Int'l Ltd., 453 F. Supp. 1347,
1350 (S.D.N.Y. 1978), affd mem., 598 F.2d 610 (2d Cir. 1979); see also
Kingsmen v. K-Tel Int'l Ltd., 557 F. Supp. 178, 181 (S.D.N.Y. 1983).
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protection if its owner stops using it, or "abandons" it. The
owner may abandon a mark through "any course of con-
duct.... including acts of omission as well as commission,"
which cause it to "lose its significance as a mark."4' Therefore,
the holder of a trademark has a duty "to take reasonable ef-
forts to police infringements of his mark, failing which the
mark is likely to be deemed abandoned, or to become generic
or descriptive (and in either event be unprotectable)."42
GTE Vantage urged that this was precisely what had
happened with the "March Madness" trademark: that IHSA
"neither protested nor otherwise tried to protect its ... mark.
Instead, it allowed the public consciousness to connect the
term with the NCAA tournament .... IHSA's position is obvi-
ously not the position taken by trademark owners who desire
to keep their marks strong, distinctive and capable of expan-
sion."43 IHSA retorted that any attempts to enjoin the use of
its mark in connection with NCAA's event would have inevita-
bly been futile, since the overwhelming majority of such use
consisted of "First Amendment-protected activities of jour-
nalists - activities over which neither the NCAA nor the
IHSA had or could have exercised any control." In other
words, IHSA argued that it makes no sense to apply the po-
lice-it-or-lose-it rule where it would require a trademark
holder to sue media figures for exercising their First Amend-
ment rights.45
IHSA's argument in this regard was creative, but not un-
precedented: a remarkably similar principle was adopted by
the D.C. District Court in Lucasfilm v. High Frontier.46 There,
the creators of the Star Wars films sought to protect their
trademark from genericization 47 by public interest groups who
41. See Lanham Act § 45, 15 U.S.C.A. § 1127.
42. Rockwell Graphic Sys. v. DEV Indus., 925 F.2d 174, 179 (7th Cir.
1991): see also 2 J. MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR
COMPETITION § 17:17 (4th ed. 1998).
43. Brief of Defendant-Appellee, supra note 13, at 32.
44. Brief of Plaintiff-Appellant, supra note 16, at 8.
45. See id. See also Yankee Publ'g, Inc. v. News America Publ'g, Inc., 809 F.
Supp. 267, 275-76 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) ("[Wihen unauthorized use of another's
mark is part of a communicative message and not a source identifier, the First
Amendment Is implicated in opposition to the trademark right.").
46. Lucasfilm Ltd. v. High Frontier, 622 F. Supp. 931 (D.D.C. 1985).
47. In light of Illinois High School Association, perhaps the appropriate term
is "dual-useification."
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had taken to using the term in reference to President
Reagan's Strategic Defense Initiative.4 8 The Lucasfilm court
refused to enjoin the defendants' use of the term, on the
ground that trademark law49 only applies to commercial uses:
The owner of a mark acquires the right to prevent the goods
to which the mark is applied from being confused with
those of others and to prevent his own trade from being di-
verted to competitors through their use of misleading
marks. There are no rights in a trademark beyond these.50
Furthermore, "[w]hen politicians, newspapers and the
public generally use the phrase star wars for convenience, in
parody or descriptively to further a communication of their
views on SDI, plaintiff has no rights as owner of the mark to
prevent this use of STAR WARS."'
However, the court went on to address Lucasfilm's con-
cern about the safety of its trademark:
Overlying this lawsuit is plaintiffs natural concern that if
he does not seek legal remedies to protect his mark he will
lose it. But the use of star wars in political propaganda,
newspapers or noncommercial, non-trade references will
not undermine plaintiffs exclusive property right to use it
in connection with goods and services.... [T]he phrase star
wars has acquired a double meaning, but it has not become
a generic term, that is a term associated with an entire
class of goods or services. Continued non-trade, noncommer-
cial use cannot take the mark away from plaintiff Lucas films
[sic]. Whether this use makes the trademark become ulti-
mately more or less valuable is a matter of conjecture, but
the trademark is still plaintiffs. The new meaning of the
phrase ... does not affect the distinct, and still strong sec-
ondary meaning of STAR WARS in trade and entertainment.
Plaintiffs right to prevent an infringing use of its mark re-
mains intact.
5 2
IHSA, naturally enough, took this to mean that it was ex-
cused from any obligation to threaten sportscasters who used
"March Madness" in reference to the NCAA Final Four with
48. See Lucasfilm, 622 F. Supp. at 932-33.
49. The IHSA argued that they were forestalled from preventing the media
use of their mark on both trademark-law and First Amendment grounds. See
Brief of Plaintiff-Appellant, supra note 16, at 15-16. The Lucasfilm court did not
reach the First Amendment issue. The nature of the obstacle, of course, is not
essential to IHSA's argument; the point is that any effort to stop the media's use
of the trademark would have been foredoomed to failure.
50. LucasflIm, 622 F. Supp. at 933.
51. Id. at 935.
52. Id. (emphasis supplied).
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legal action. 3 This seems a reasonable interpretation; it is
certainly difficult to read the foregoing passage as suggesting
that Lucasfilm's rights in its trademark were preserved be-
cause it had brought an unsuccessful lawsuit to protect
them.
The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, however,
found that Lucasfilm was not on point.54 Judge Posner ex-
plained that the right which the Lucasfilm court found to be
protected is simply the same right the plaintiff already had:
"to use its trademark 'Star Wars' to designate the movies and
the merchandise associated with them."55 If a hypothetical
manufacturer of the sort of anti-missile systems contem-
plated by SDI were to market them under the "Star Wars"
trademark, "nothing in the Lucasfilm opinion or in the princi-
ples of trademark law would entitle Lucasfilm to enjoin that
use of the name."56 By analogy, presumably, nothing in that
opinion or those principles entitles IHSA to enjoin NCAA's use
of "March Madness."
The underlying point here has to be that the Lucasfilm
dictum confers upon the plaintiff no more rights to enforce its
trademark than the plaintiff had prior to the media's use of
the term - but this attacks a straw man, since that point
was never at issue. In the hypothetical instance Judge Posner
posits, Lucasfilm could not have enforced its trademark in
any event, with or without the media use of "Star Wars," be-
cause there would be no likelihood of confusion between Lu-
casfilm's goods and services and those of the hypothetical
weapon manufacturer. Likelihood of confusion has been
dubbed the "keystone of infringement";57 the likelihood of
confusion between a high-tech military weapon system and a
trilogy of futuristic samurai films is self-evidently nil. 58
53. See Brief of Plaintiff-Appellant, supra note 16, at 15-16 ("Because a
mark owner is without a right to stop such uses, it can hardly be argued that he
has an obligation to try to stop them by begging, cajoling or otherwise.").
54. See Ill. High Sch. Ass'n v. GTE Vantage, Inc., 99 F.3d 244, 248 (7th Cir.
1996), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 1083 (1997).
55. Id.
56. See id.
57. 3 MCCARTHY, supra note 42, § 23.1.
58. See Fuller v. Fuller Brush Co., 595 F. Supp. 1088, 1091-92 (E.D. Wis.
1984) (finding triable question of fact as to substantial likelihood that door-to-
door salesman of household products who dressed in bright green sport coat,
sunglasses in the shape of butterflies, and flowing cape with stuffed animals
[VOL. 21:785
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What is considerably less self-evident is whether Judge
Posner's hypothetical is itself on point. Would he have been
so quick to dismiss Lucasfilm's right to prevent the commer-
cial use of the "Star Wars" mark by, for example, a hypotheti-
cal filmmaker who created and marketed a visual mock-up of
the proposed SDI system in action, complete with state-of-
the-art special effects and a thrilling orchestral score? That
would be somewhat more closely analogous to the relation-
ship between a regional high-school basketball tournament
and a nationwide college basketball tournament.
It may be symptomatic of Judge Posner's level of confi-
dence in his distinction of Lucasfilm that he felt obliged to
shore it up with the observation that district court holdings
are not binding on appellate courts." This is true enough; the
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit may of course decide
a case differently than the D.C. District if it chooses. It is
distressing, however, that Judge Posner ignored the fact that
Lucasfilm raised precisely the same issue raised by Illinois
High School Association. The only real difference between the
two cases is that Lucasfilm brought its legal action before any
infringing use of its mark had occurred - Lucasfilm, that is,
attempted to be "a serious trademark holder [who] is assidu-
ous" in protecting its mark6° - and IHSA waited until after-
ward.
The crucial question is not, as Judge Posner seems to
frame it, whether media use of a trademark confers new
rights on the owner; it is whether such use can divest the
mark's owner of rights it already had. The Lucasfilm court
answered that question in the negative. As noted, the Seventh
Circuit was at liberty to disagree. It would have been more
satisfying, however, if it had disapproved the previous case
expressly, rather than distinguishing it into non-existence on
the basis of a blatant mischaracterization.
attached to the shoulders could be confused with traditional "Norman Rockwell
painting" image of the Fuller Brush man).
59. See Ill. High Sch. Ass'n, 99 F.3d at 247.
60. Id. at 246.
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Why is This Reverse Confusion Different From Any
Other Reverse Confusion?
IHSA sought merely to assert a right it claimed it already
had: the right to enjoin a commercial (that is, non-media) user
of the term "March Madness" in reference to the NCAA Final
Four, under a reverse-confusion theory.' As discussed
above,62 reverse confusion arises when:
the junior user saturates the market with a similar trade-
mark and overwhelms the senior user. The public comes to
assume the senior user's products are really the junior
user's or that the former has become somehow connected
to the latter. The result is that the senior user loses the
value of the trademark - its product identity, corporate
identity, control over its goodwill and reputation, and ability
to move into new markets.
63
The need to protect trademarks in this circumstance has
been appreciated since at least 1918, when Justice Holmes
pointed out that "[t]he ordinary case.., is palming off the
defendant's product as the plaintiffs[,] but the same evil may
follow from the opposite falsehood - from saying whether in
words or by implication that the plaintiffs product is the de-
fendant's ... ,64 However, Justice Holmes's dictum was not
formally adopted by a federal appellate court until 1977,
when the Tenth Circuit recognized that "[i]f the law is to limit
recovery to passing off, anyone with adequate size and re-
sources can adopt any trademark and develop a new meaning
for that trademark as identification of the second user's
products."65 Perhaps significantly, the Seventh Circuit had
considered and rejected a cause of action for trademark in-
fringement by reverse confusion nine years earlier.66 It did not
recognize the principle until 1992 and was among the last
61. See Ill. High Sch. Ass'n, 99 F.3d at 246. See also Brief of Plaintiff-
Appellant, supra note 16, at 24-28.
62. See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
63. Ameritech, Inc. v. American Info. Techs. Corp., 811 F.2d 960, 964 (6th
Cir. 1987).
64. International News Serv. v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215, 247 (1918).
65. Big 0 Tire Dealers, Inc., 561 F.2d at 1372.
66. See Westward Coach Mfg. Co. v. Ford Motor Co., 388 F.2d 627 (7th Cir.
1968).
67. See Sands, Taylor & Wood Co. v. Quaker Oats Co., 978 F.2d 947 (7th
Cir. 1992).
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of the federal circuits to do so.
68
The facts in Illinois High School Association describe a
classic case of reverse confusion: the NCAA and its licensee
are undisputedly junior users of the "March Madness" mark;69
the NCAA is significantly larger and better publicized than the
IHSA;70 and as noted, a vast proportion of the public has
come to associate "March Madness" with the NCAA rather
than the IHSA.7' Judge Posner, however, took the position
that IHSA had no cause of action for infringement by reverse
confusion, because "[t]he issue of confusion does not
arise... until it is determined that the plaintiff has a trade-
mark that the law will protect; and... IHSA does not, so far
as the use of the term 'March Madness' in connection with
the NCAA tournament is concerned."72 This, presumably, was
because of the long-standing association between the mark
and the NCAA's Final Four tournament, which in Judge Pos-
ner's view gave the NCAA the right to use and license the
mark in reference to that event. 3
68. See, e.g., Banff, Ltd. v. Federated Dep't Stores, Inc., 841 F.2d 486 (2d
Cir. 1988); Capital Films Corp. v. Charles Fries Prod., Inc., 628 F.2d 387 (5th
Cir. 1980); Ameritech, Inc. v. American Info. Techs. Corp., 811 F.2d 960 (6th
Cir. 1987); Fuddruckers, Inc. v. Doc's B.R. Others, Inc., 826 F.2d 837 (9th Cir.
1987).
69. See Ill. High Sch. Ass'n, 99 F.3d at 245 (IHSA has used the trademark
"March Madness" since the early 1940s).
70. See id. at 246 (conceding that "NCAA dwarfs IHSA).
71. See Brief of Defendant - Appellee, supra note 13.
72. Ill. High Sch. Ass'n, 99 F.3d at 246.
73. In their brief to the Seventh Circuit, defendants cited several cases
which appear, at first glance, to suggest that public use of a term with reference
to a good or service can confer a property right in that term on the provider of
the good or service, with no action whatsoever on the provider's part. See Brief
of Defendant-Appellee, supra note 13, at 25-26. The cases included Coca-Cola
Co. v. Busch, 44 F. Supp. 405 (E.D. Pa. 1942) (the public's use of "Coke" created
rights in the plaintiff that were senior to defendant's use of "Koke"); American
Stock Exchange v. American Express Co., 207 U.S.P.Q. 356 (Trademark Tr. &
App. Bd. 1980) (the public's use of "Amex" created right in the term in American
Express senior to that of American Stock Exchange); Pieper v. Playboy Enter.,
Inc., 179 U.S.P.Q. 318 (Trademark Tr. & App. Bd. 1973) (widespread use of the
term "Bunny Club" in reference to Playboy Clubs created rights in Playboy sen-
ior to those of owner of a club by that name). Judge Posner apparently found
these cases persuasive, but they're factually distinguishable: a notable feature
of all of them is that the marks in question lacked any history of prior use. The
public called Playboy Clubs "Bunny Clubs" for a long time before the infringing
use, for example. This line of cases arguably stands for the proposition that
public association can confer rights where there has been no prior use of the
mark - but, of course, that is not the situation in Illinois High School Associa-
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This is somewhat curious reasoning. The question of
whether IHSA does or does not have a trademark the law will
protect is, of course, precisely what was before the Seventh
Circuit - but, according to the formulation quoted above, it
is the question upon which turns the issue of whether or not
protection may be extended. Stripped to its essence, the
opinion appears to hold that the trademark cannot be pro-
tected because the trademark cannot be protected.
To be sure, the IHSA is asking that its mark be protected
against use with respect to the NCAA tournament, a service
which IHSA does not provide and over which they have no
control - but this will inevitably be true in any action for
trademark infringement. If Pam, owner of the trademark
Wonder Widgets, sues Dave to enjoin him from marketing
One-Door Widgets,74 we do not inquire into whether Pam has
the right to use the WONDER mark in connection with Dave's
widgets. Of course she does not; Pam has no rights at all with
respect to Dave's widgets. Pam's cause of action for infringe-
ment arises from the fact that Dave does not have the right to
use the ONE-DOOR mark in connection with Dave's own
widgets, because Pam owns the WONDER mark, and Dave's
use of ONE-DOOR is potentially confusing to the public.
The fact that the species of confusion alleged in Illinois
High School Association is styled "reverse" does not mean that
the inquiry should be turned on its head. As in Pam v. Dave,
IHSA sought to enjoin the NCAA's licensee from using a mark
which IHSA owns, where the use had the potential of con-
fusing the public. As in Pam v. Dave, the appropriate inquiry
is not into whether the IHSA has the right to use the disputed
mark with respect to the NCAA's product; it is into whether
the NCAA has that right. Under the "palming off' theory of
infringement, this would turn on whether the NCAA's use was
likely to mislead the public into believing that its product's
source was the IHSA; under a reverse-confusion theory, it
would turn on whether the NCAA's use was likely to mislead
the public into believing that the IHSA was somehow affiliated
with or sponsored by the NCAA. The Seventh Circuit appears
tion. See Brief of Plaintiff-Appellant, supra note 16, at 8 n.3.
74. Trademark infringement by "sound-alike" marks is a well-established
principle: "[tirademarks, like small children, are not only seen but heard." Gro-
trian, Helfferich, Schulz, Th. Steinweg Nachf. v. Steinway & Sons, 523 F.2d
1331, 1340 (2d Cir. 1975).
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to have been so overwhelmed by the patently negative answer
to the former question that it never reached the latter.
Illinois High School Association, in short, could readily
have been decided as a straightforward reverse-confusion
case. It is instructive to compare it to Sands, Taylor & Wood
Co. v. Quaker Oats Co.,75 the leading such case in the Seventh
Circuit, in which Quaker was held liable for infringing plain-
tiffs 'Thirst Aid" mark through reverse confusion, generated
by Quaker's massive advertising campaign for Gatorade."
Precisely as in Illinois High School Association, the disputed
mark had acquired widespread association in the public con-
sciousness with the junior user's product.77 The principal
distinction between the two cases is that in Sands, Taylor &
Wood, the change in public perception had been accom-
plished by the media in its advertising persona; in Illinois
High School Association, it had been accomplished by the me-
dia's journalistic face.
It is difficult to see why that should make a difference.
The only conceivable reason it might is that Quaker's conduct
could be viewed as mildly culpable since, by paying for the
advertising, it affirmatively caused the media blitz which in
turn caused the reverse-confusion; the NCAA, in contrast,
merely took advantage of the media's volunteering to do the
job. This distinction is unpersuasive for at least two reasons.
First, the plaintiff in Sands, Taylor & Wood could, presuma-
bly, have sued Quaker to enjoin its use of "Thirst Aid" earlier,
before it became associated with Gatorade, but IHSA had no
comparable opportunity to stop the media's use of "March
Madness;" it seems somewhat perverse to reward the party
who could (at least in theory) have taken steps to police its
trademark, and to penalize the party who was barred from
doing so by the First Amendment.
The second and more important reason is that culpability
doesn't matter. Trademark infringement is a strict liability
offense: if the plaintiffs trademark is protectable, and the
defendant's use creates a substantial likelihood of confusion
75. 978 F.2d 947, 958-60 (7th Cir. 1992).
76. The offending use was the widely repeated slogan "Gatorade is Thirst
Aid for That Deep Down Body Thirst." Id. at 950.
77. See id. at 960 & n. 14. In fact, at the time of the filing of the lawsuit, the
plaintiff was not marketing any product whatsoever under the disputed trade-
mark. See id. at 950.
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among consumers, the defendant has infringed, culpability or
no culpability. A reasonable argument could be made that,
even if no previous case has announced one, a culpability
standard should apply in reverse confusion cases. However,
Judge Posner gave no indication that his refusal to follow
Sands, Taylor & Wood was motivated by considerations of
culpability vel non; instead, he simply rejected the reverse-
confusion theory out of hand.78
His reasons for doing so are perhaps somewhat eluci-
dated by a passage in the opinion from which it is easy to in-
fer that he misunderstands the rationale behind the doctrine.
Reverse confusion, he explains, arises 'Where a powerful
junior user of the trademark... swamps the senior user's
use of it with advertising and other publicity that extinguishes
consumer demand for the senior user's product."79 The objec-
tionable thing about the reverse confusion alleged by IHSA,
Judge Posner suggests, is that it "is likely to impair IHSA's
ability to make money by licensing its trademark on mer-
chandise and other incidentals."0 In fact, neither the extinc-
tion of demand for the senior user's product nor any interfer-
ence with the senior user's ability to make money is an
element of reverse confusion, as traditionally understood.
Rather, the evil in reverse confusion is the confusion it-
self. As one commentator points out, a small senior user
might have any number of reasons for not wishing to be as-
sociated in the mind of the public with a nationally recog-
nized junior user, and the reasons might very well be entirely
non-commercial in nature: for example, "the junior user's
company might stand for certain ideals with which the senior
user does not want to be associated."81 This is not merely
speculative: that very situation arose in Pump, Inc. v. Collins
Management, Inc.,82 where Pump, an obscure local rock band
composed of body builders whose music "promote[ed] physi-
cal self-improvement as an alternative to drugs," 3 sued the
nationally-known rock band Aerosmith over their use of
78. See Ill. High Sch. Ass'n v. GTE Vantage, Inc., 99 F.3d 244, 246-47 (7th
Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 1083 (1997).
79. Id. at 246 (emphasis supplied).
80. Id. (emphasis supplied).
81. Note, supra note 61, at 184.
82. 746 F. Supp. 1159 (D. Mass. 1990).
83. Id. at 1161.
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Pump84 as the title of an album. Although the court ultimately
held for the defendants, it noted sympathetically that the
band Pump was placed in a particularly uncomfortable posi-
tion by the possibility that consumers might think they had
appropriated Aerosmith's title, given the conflict between
Pump's strong anti-drug stance and Aerosmith's reputedly
"hedonistic lifestyle and... rather laissez-faire attitude to-
ward substance abuse."
85
Although no rationale of this sort was set forth in Illinois
High School Association, it is easy in hindsight to imagine that
the IHSA might feel precisely as uncomfortable at being asso-
ciated with the NCAA as Pump did at being associated with
Aerosmith. On March 26, 1998 - that is, on the very eve of
the 1998 season's Final Four tournament - newspapers
around the country broke the story that "a federal grand jury
[in Chicago] indicted two former Northwestern University
[basketball] players on charges of attempting to fix the out-
come of three contests during the 1994-95 season."86 The two
players were charged with conspiring with professional gam-
blers to alter their play so that their opponents would cover
the point spread.87 Billy Packer, a noted sports analyst for
CBS, points out that NCAA basketball is actually somewhat
infamous for incidents of this sort: 'These things seem to run
in cycles, almost like 10-year cycles .... In the early '50s, we
had the CCNY scandal. Ten years later, we had the tragic
business with Connie Hawkins and the others. In the '70s, we
had Boston College. Then Arizona State and now this."88 IHSA
might very reasonably not wish to be connected in the public
consciousness with gambling; the more so since the scandal
occurred in Chicago, on IHSA's home turf.
The harm visited on the senior user by reverse confusion
arises from its loss of control over the reputation of its trade-
mark. If the junior user manufactures a shoddy product, or is
84. AEROSMITH, PUMP (Uni/Geffen 1989).
85. 746 F. Supp. at 1161 n.11. The court piously recited, however, that it
"expresse[d] no opinion as to the truth of such rumors as they relate to Aeros-
mith." Id.
86. Stephen Braun, Basketball Scandal Rocks College Ranks, L.A. TIMES,
Mar. 27, 1998 at Al.
87. Id.
88. Quoted in Jim O'Donnell, CBS' Packer Sees Cycle in Point-Shaving Scan-
dals. CHICAGO SUN-TIMES. Mar. 27. 1998. at 118.
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a well-known drug abuser, or is besmirched by a long string
of gambling scandals, the harm inheres in the likelihood that
the public will attribute these negative qualities to the senior
user. The doctrine of reverse confusion is intended to forestall
even the possibility of such an outcome.
To the extent the Seventh Circuit's rejection of the reverse
confusion theory in Illinois High School Association was moti-
vated by an understanding of the doctrine which focused ex-
clusively on the direct effects on the senior user's pocketbook,
the decision is profoundly flawed. The basic question in this
case should have been whether there was a substantial like-
lihood that the fans of a high-school basketball association's
statewide championship tournament might be erroneously
led to believe that the association had infringed on the
trademark of a college basketball association's nationally-
publicized championship tournament. If the answer to that
question was yes, it was perfectly sufficient, without more, to
support liability for infringement by reverse confusion.
Indeed, the rationale behind Illinois High School Associa-
tion, carried to its logical conclusion, rejects the principle of
reverse confusion entirely. The holding apparently proceeds
from the premise that the existence of a strong marketplace
association between the junior user's product and the junior
user's use of a trademark, regardless of how it came to exist,
confers upon the junior user the right to use the mark. Since
the junior user has that right (the argument goes), and so
does the senior user, the purported trademark is no longer a
unitary designator of origin, so it can't possibly be a protect-
able trademark at all, and therefore there's no need to reach
the question of whether there's a likelihood of confusion.89
The problem with this argument is that any reverse-
confusion fact pattern is invariably going to feature a strong
association between the junior user's product and his use of
the mark; that, after all, is the defining characteristic of re-
verse confusion. If that fact, without more, proves that there's
no need to ask whether there's a likelihood of confusion -
which is what Illinois High School Association seems to be
saying - then there's never going to be an opportunity to
apply the rule of Sands, Taylor & Wood. Surely that's a suffi-
ciently absurd conclusion to, suggest that there's something
89. See supra notes 72 and 73 and accompanying text
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wrong with the premise.
IV
What's So Terrible About Dual Use?
If the Seventh Circuit's analysis in Illinois High School As-
sociation is widely adopted, it will undermine the social utility
of trademark law in several fundamental ways.
First, and most profoundly, the entire concept of a dual-
use trademark defenestrates the fundamental principle of
trademark law that trademarks are supposed to be designa-
tions of unitary source, origin, sponsorship, or association,90
since a "dual-use" mark may identify several alternative
sources for very similar goods or services. Such dual use will
inevitably result in consumer confusion, and is therefore
contrary to the goals of trademark protection. 91
On a practical level, the court fails to explain how the
duties associated with trademark protection are to be allo-
cated between the dual users.92 As noted above,93 trademark
owners not only have the right to prevent unauthorized uses
of their marks, they also have an obligation to enforce their
rights against unauthorized commercial encroachment, in or-
der to ensure that their marks continue to serve as non-
confusing source identifiers.94 How does this work when there
are two owners of the same mark? For example, if Abby and
Bob are joint tenants95 of a dual-use mark, and Abby fails to
enforce the mark against unauthorized users for long enough
that the mark, under traditional law, becomes abandoned,
90. See supra notes 28 and 29 and accompanying text.
91. See Durango Herald, Inc. v. Riddle, 719 F. Supp. 941, 951 (1988).
92. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 9.
93. See supra text accompanying notes 40-43.
94. See 2 MCCARTHY, supra note 42, § 17:17.
95. The conceptual analogy between joint tenancy and dual use of a trade-
mark originates with Richard W. Young, counsel for IHSA. See Petition for Writ
of Certiorari at 9. The term is intended to point up the distinction between dual
use and concurrent use. Concurrent use arises when two users of a trademark
avoid confusion between their products through either geographic separation or
dissimilarity of the products. To carry Mr. Young's property analogy one step
further, concurrent use might be thought of as "timesharing" a trademark: each
owner has rights in the mark, but no owner may use it for the same purpose at
the same time as another owner.
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what rights remain to Bob? We are left to speculate.
To make matters worse, the trademark at issue in this
case is licensed to third parties by both of its co-owners.96 For
example, IHSA currently licenses the mark "March Madness"
for use on Wilson basketballs," and it seems reasonable to
suppose that NCAA may, under the dual-use doctrine, license
the same mark to Spalding for a use on a different line of
basketballs. This scenario would obviously give rise to a near
certainty of consumer confusion as to the source of the bas-
ketballs, but it raises any number of other troubling ques-
tions as well. For example, could Spalding instead solicit of-
fers from each dual user, and license the mark from the
lowest bidder? Would Spalding's use infringe IHSA's mark? If
a third manufacturer were to begin making "March Madness"
basketballs without license from either IHSA or NCAA, which
of the two would have the duty of incurring the expense and
inconvenience of litigating to enjoin such use? Could either of
them validly refute a laches defense by asserting that the
other one should have defended the mark? Such issues will
inevitably arise when the sourcing function of trademarks is
abandoned, as it has been by the Seventh Circuit's decision.
Furthermore, when the Seventh Circuit refers in the
same breath to "dual-use or multiple-use terms,"98 it hints
strongly that there is nothing special about duality, as op-
posed to 3-, 4-, or n-way divisions of trademark rights. It
seems reasonable to suppose, for example, that if a group of
sportscasters were to begin today referring to the National
Basketball Association's playoff games as "March Madness,"99
the Seventh Circuit would hold that this could ultimately
confer on the NBA the right to license the term for use on
96. This entire controversy arose because the NCAA licensed the mark to
GTE Vantage. With regard to the IHSA's licensing ventures, see supra note 17
and accompanying text.
97. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 4 n.2.
98. Ill. High Sch. Ass'n v. GTE Vantage, Inc., 99 F.3d 244, 247 (7th Cir.
1996), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 1083 (1997).
99. Those conversant with sports will instantly recognize the unlikely na-
ture of this hypothetical, since the NBA playoffs in fact take place in April and
May. This makes no difference to the underlying point, however. Nothing sug-
gests that the multiple-use principle is limited to trademarks associated with
particular times of year; it seems safe to suppose that the Seventh Circuit's de-
cision would have been the same if the disputed phrase had been, say, "Hoop
Derangement" or "Net Insanity."
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mass-marketed team paraphernalia; in other words, that a
"triple-use trademark" could be created. The problems asso-
ciated with such a decision should be readily apparent. First,
of course, it is utterly at variance with the principle that
trademarks are supposed to identify a unitary source of the
good or service.'00 More seriously, how many joint tenants
must inhabit the trademark before it becomes a generic term
for all basketball tournaments, and none of the users may
claim any property rights in it? The opinion gives us little
help in answering this question.
Finally, the Seventh Circuit's rejection of the Lucasfilm
dictum'0 ' will inevitably have the effect of encouraging frivo-
lous litigation by trademark holders - "frivolous" in the
sense that these suits will of necessity be brought by plain-
tiffs who have no conceivable chance of prevailing, but who
bring them anyway in an attempt to protect their trademarks
from becoming "dual-use."'0 2 Judge Posner himself concedes
that "IHSA could not have sued Musburger for referring to
'March Madness' in a news program (including a program of
sports news)."'0 3 But he goes on to suggest that IHSA should
have sued CBS anyway, perhaps for using "March Madness"
to promote its broadcasts of the NCAA championship' 4 (de-
spite the apparent lack of any suggestion in the record that
CBS ever did so). "A serious trademark holder is assiduous in
endeavoring to convince... influential persons," including
those operating under First Amendment protection, to respect
the meaning of a trademark, and "[tihese efforts sometimes
succeed."'0 5 IHSA made no such doomed effort; hence, "IHSA
was not assiduous."' 6 The inescapable conclusion is that it is
immaterial whether these efforts succeed or not; what is im-
100. See supra notes 28 and 29 and accompanying text.
101. See supra notes 46-52 and accompanying text.
102. "[To avoid the risk of losing rights in their marks, trademark owners
will be compelled to challenge, whether by economic influence, threat of suit, or
otherwise, the media's non-commercial, descriptive and fair uses of trademarks.
The Seventh Circuit's decision upsets the balance between the protection af-
forded trademarks and the protection afforded non-commercial speech because
it compels mark owners to challenge the media in order to prevent a transfer of
their trademark rights." Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 10.






portant is that the trademark owner make them.
This cannot conceivably be sound social policy. It has
long been recognized that "[tihe protection given speech and
press was fashioned to assure unfettered interchange of
ideas;'' 117 surely the practice of penalizing otherwise unof-
fending trademark owners with the loss of valuable intellec-
tual property rights for their failure to insist that journalists
and the media refrain from interchanging certain ideas rises
to a "fetter." Defending against a frivolous lawsuit- or even
responding to a cease-and-desist letter with a well-justified
refusal- are potentially expensive and time-consuming vexa-
tions to which there is absolutely no need to put the media in
the interests of assuring that trademark holders meet for-
malistic standards of assiduity.
Lucasfilm proposed a bright-line rule: "the use of [a
trademark-protected term] in political propaganda, newspa-
pers or noncommercial, non-trade references will not under-
mine plaintiffs exclusive property right to use it in connection
with goods and services."'' 8 The Seventh Circuit dimmed the
line by rejecting the distinction between commercial and non-
commercial expression. Under its decision, trademark owners
must fear communicative, non-commercial uses of their




'The law of intellectual property does not sanction use of
one... trademark by two competitors in the same market."'0 9
In Illinois High School Association, the Seventh Circuit ignored
this fundamental principle. The opinion is probably best ex-
plained as an attempt to grant a partial victory to each side in
a situation where the judge believed the equities to weigh
equally - but this approach was misguided, for two reasons.
107. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957); New York Times v.
Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 269 (1964).
108. Lucasfilm Ltd. v. High Frontier, 622 F. Supp. 931, 935 (D.D.C. 1985).
109. Durango Herald, Inc. v. Riddle, 719 F. Supp. 941, 951 (1988). "Although
a word may have developed a meaning in a non-commercial, non-trade context,
as long as it still functions in the commercial context to Identify the good will of
its source, it has meaning as a trademark and will be protected against con-
fusingly similar commercial use." 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 42, § 3.2.
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First and foremost, the equities did not weigh equally.
NCAA was undisputedly the junior user of "March Madness,"
and the first in time is generally considered to be first in
right."0 Moreover, NCAA had no investment whatsoever in the
mark, the public association between the phrase and NCAA's
tournament having arisen through the happy fortuity that the
media made use of the phrase to describe the event. It seems
untenable to suggest that IHSA's right to control a trademark
it undisputedly owned weighs equally with NCAA's right to
profit by licensing a term bestowed upon it by sportscasters.
Secondly, even if the equities had weighed equally, the
invention of the so-called dual-use trademark would not have
been the appropriate remedy. In a feat of judicial legerdemain
reminiscent of King Solomon's famous offer to divide the ob-
ject of a dispute equally between the contending parties,"'
Judge Posner entered a decree that, in effect, left both plain-
tiffs and defendants free to use the [disputed trademark].
Even if this result were fair as between the parties, it is not
fair in respect to the public. It creates the very 'source' confu-
sion that legal trademark.., doctrine developed to avoid.
When arguing parties are, in a sense, both responsible for the
success of a name, a court may find it difficult to decide
which, in fact, 'owns' the name; the temptation may be great
to say "both own it" or try to 'divide' the name among them.
The public interest, however, normally requires an exclusive
award.' 2Solomon's judgment established his reputation as
the wisest of judges, but that reputation might have been
very different indeed if the baby had actually wound up in
two pieces. The United States Supreme Court has declined
one invitation to assume the role of the rightful mother in the
Solomon story - that is, to speak out and resolve the is-
sue."13 It is greatly to be hoped that if a second invitation is
issued, it will be more hospitably received.
110. See, e.g., G's Bottoms Up Soc. Club v. F.P.M. Indus., Inc., 574 F. Supp.
1490, 1496 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) ("under the general rule of first in time, first in
right .... [the defendant] has the superior right to use the mark.").
S111. See 3 Kings 3:16-28.
112. Bell v. StreetWise Records, Ltd., 761 F.2d 67, 75-76 (1st Cir. 1985)
(Breyer, J., concurring).
113. The Court denied certiorari in Ill. High Sch. Ass'n v. GTE Vantage, Inc.,
117 S.Ct. 1083 (1997).
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